CENTER OF GRAVITY DETERMINATION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WAR AGAINST RADICAL ISLAMIC TERRORISM
In 1996, Osama Bin Laden formally declared a holy war on the United States Harry Summers argued that America failed to achieve its political objectives in Vietnam because the enemy applied Clausewitz's "center of gravity" (CoG) concept better than the U.S. 5 Since that time, CoG has been part of the contemporary strategy lexicon and has been a key, though controversial, facet of military campaign plan design --the conceptual linkage of ends, ways, and means. 6 
How does Clausewitz's CoG theory apply to the U.S. -led war against radical Islamic terrorism and what are the broad short and long term implications for U.S. strategy?
This paper examines Carl Von Clausewitz's CoG concept and applies it to the war against radical Islamic terrorism. It briefly describes the confusion associated with the concept, compares the current doctrinal definition of CoG with Clausewitz's likely intent, and describes the concept's contemporary importance and applicability. It describes the nature of the threat to U.S. national interests posed by radical Islamic terrorists, identifies the enemy and friendly
CoGs in a U.S.-led WOT, and highlights some broad short and long term implications of these CoGs for U.S. strategy.
This paper makes the argument that Clausewitz's CoG theory, while not a panacea, is still important today. Its application to the U.S. -led war against radical Islamic terrorism suggests a protracted campaign that will be a true test of America's greatness reminiscent in many respects to the test America passed in defeating the Soviet Communist threat during the Cold
War. This paper concludes that the U.S. needs to do a better job educating Americans as to the interests, timetable, and cost and risks involved; needs to achieve a much more effective use of all elements of national power to reduce the levels of hatred, ignorance, and tolerance for anti-U.S. terrorism in the Muslim world; and needs to achieve sufficient bipartisan consensus prior to 2008 to sustain the fight in this test of wills.
This paper starts by looking at the WOT in the abstract before addressing the status of and implications for stated U.S. policies. It provides a broad framework within which a more detailed study of ends, ways, and means that are relevant to defeating enemy CoGs and protecting friendly CoGs in the war on radical Islamic terror can occur.
CENTER OF GRAVITY THEORY
The CoG concept is a difficult and contentious topic. It is not a panacea but it is extremely important. Professor Douglas B. Campbell, Director of the U.S. Army War College's Center for Strategic Leadership, notes, "The design and conduct of campaigns and major operations begins with determining the center of gravity." 7 Properly and consistently applied, the concept can help inform a rational decision with regard to committing elements of national power. It also helps focus war efforts and campaigns and helps ensure that strategic, operational, and tactical objectives are logically linked. 8 
CENTER OF GRAVITY: WHAT IS IT AND WHY IS IT DIFFICULT?
The concept of "center of gravity" (CoG) is about identifying and focusing to defeat the enemy's "hub of all power and movement, on which everything (in the war) depends" 9 while protecting one's own most irreplaceable source(s) of relevant power. CoG is difficult for many due to the complexity of the unfinished book that introduced the term; the different service interpretations in contemporary literature; the tendency in joint doctrine and related discussions to focus primarily at the operational level and on the military element of power; the challenging nature of the contemporary operational environment; and the lack of an agreed upon methodology for CoG determination and application.
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On War: Source of Understanding/Source of Confusion
The didactic style of his day, the challenge of fully describing the nature of war, and the fact that Clausewitz was unable to finish his epic work and achieve the level of clarity he desired, make On War a challenging read. The unfinished On War often confuses its readers regarding CoG because the author used the term interchangeably with another term, because the ideas in Book Six and Book Eight are not cleanly integrated, and because many questions are not explicitly answered.
The term "center of gravity" is controversial in and of itself; some argue whether it is even an accurate translation of the idea Clausewitz was trying to articulate. The English translation "center of gravity" comes from Clausewitz's use of the German words "Centra gravitates" and "schwerpunkt". In his draft of Book Six, Clausewitz used the terms interchangeably when describing the same concept. Peter Paret and Michael Howard, editors of the most widely used translation of On War, translated both as "center of gravity" 12 when in fact there were two terms used in the original. Literally, schwer means heavy and der punkt means point or spot. 13 Taking that definition literally connoted to many a physics analogy --one that is difficult to apply in the contemporary operational environment and one that grossly oversimplifies the idea that Clausewitz was trying to convey. In countries subject to domestic strife, the center of gravity is generally the capital. In small countries that rely on larger ones, it is usually the army of their protector. Among alliances, it lies in the community of interest, and in popular uprisings it is the personalities of the leader and public opinion. It is against these that our energies should be directed. 16 At the end of Book Six, Clausewitz cautions the reader that his discussion of the CoG concept is not yet complete and that he "will describe how this idea of a center of gravity in the enemy's forces operates throughout the plan of war" later in Book Eight. 17 Initially, each service tended to mold CoG theory to suit its own organizational essence. For example, the Air Force used the term CoG to describe strategic bombing target sets. 24 For a long time, Marine doctrine, which has long focused on exploiting enemy vulnerabilities, insisted that the CoG was a "critical vulnerability" 25 rather than the source of all power and strength. The
Army viewed CoG as the source of power and strength and advocated attacking it via (predominantly land-based) decisive points. 26 But the Navy advocated reaching centers of gravity via weaknesses and vulnerabilities, centering its discussions on (surprise) sea lines of communications. 27 The services have come a long way towards jointness and common understanding in the past decade but the initially divergent interpretations of the term and the resulting myriad of contradictory examples of CoGs remain a source of difficulty. It is difficult to undo the many misinterpretations that were spawned by service ethnocentrism and or parochialism. Several retired general officers who "learned" CoG during this era continue to pollute the dialogue by misusing the term during television commentary. 28 While joint doctrine has done much to break down service stovepipes and achieve students to the erroneous conclusion that by attacking and defeating a military force's source of power, we will achieve our political aims. This is as absurd as an individual service claiming it can achieve theater level military aims without help from the other services. To achieve political aims, we must impose our will on the enemy's strategic CoG while protecting our own --something that typically requires all elements of power. Imposing our will on the operational
CoG with primarily military force is important but does not, in and of itself, lead to the collapse of the enemy strategic CoG or the attainment of political aims.
Another source of difficulty in CoG determination and application is that the operational environment today is more complex than when the term was introduced in the 1800s. Another major source of difficulty is that there is no agreed upon methodology for CoG determination and application. While work done with experts at the U.S. Army War College produced a methodology that has proved useful in guiding students to consider relevant aspects of the theater and strategic environments and applying a litmus test to CoG candidates 33 , no such methodology has been accepted for incorporation into joint doctrine. Despite the popular physics analogy, CoG determination and application is as much (or more) art as science;
therefore it is doubtful that doctrine will (or should) go to great lengths to tell one precisely how to use the concept. Perhaps more than any other reason, CoG is difficult because war itself is difficult and CoG determination necessarily involves an understanding of the essence of warfare in the context of an increasingly complex strategic environment.
Strategic and Operational Centers of Gravity
Clausewitz argued that in war, it is a wasteful exertion to use military force or other elements of national power in ways that do not contribute to imposing your will on the enemy's CoG and/or sustaining your own source of power and strength. 34 This author contends that the CoG concept applies at strategic and operational levels --to both the military leg of the Clausewitzian trinity and the trinity as a whole. The strategic CoG is the root source of power and strength relevant to pursuing war aims. In a nation state, it is found at the strategic national level. A litmus test for an enemy strategic CoG candidate is whether imposing our will on it will create the deteriorating effect that prevents our foe from achieving his aims and allows the achievement of our own in a sufficiently decisive way. 35 In wars between two nation states, the strategic (national) CoG is often some aspect of the source of government --the will of the people in a democracy or the ruler/his inner circle in a more autocratic regime. 36 In wars involving multiple nations, the strategic CoG is often some aspect of the existing or potential coalition. The operational (theater) CoG is often the most critical aspect of the enemy's fielded forces. 37 It is heavily dependent on theater objectives. A litmus test for an enemy operational
CoG candidate is whether imposing our will on it will lead to accomplishment of our military aims and denial of the enemy's military aims.
The degree to which one must directly attack these CoGs is determined in large part by the strategic objectives. OPERATION DESERT STORM offers a contemporary case study. In When applied to a war or intervention involving non-state actors, the enemy strategic CoG can often be viewed as the fundamental source of the problem or situation that is leading us to consider military intervention. 38 A question to ask when screening identified friendly strategic CoG candidates is: what national or international source of strength must we have, protect, and sustain at all costs in order to continue on and achieve our strategic aims? A question to ask when screening friendly operational CoG candidates is: what aspect of our forces must we have at all costs in order to continue on/achieve our military objectives enroute (or in parallel to) imposing our will on the strategic CoG? The basics of CoG application are summarized in Figure 1 below.
FIGURE 1 DYNAMIC LINKAGES BETWEEN CENTERS OF GRAVITY AND RELATIVE INTERESTS, OBJECTIVES, TIMETABLES, AND COST/RISK TOLERANCE
There are dynamic linkages between CoGs, relative interests, objectives, timetables, and cost/risk tolerance. Asymmetries in this calculus are typically major factors when a militarily superior power is defeated by smaller foes. Napoleon's ill-fated invasion of Russia and the American experience in Somalia offer examples, in conventional warfare and in military operations other than war respectively, where smaller foes defeated stronger powers due to such asymmetries. On the other hand, the stronger power is more likely to triumph when interests are as high or higher than the enemy's and when there is a commensurate willingness to endure the costs, risks, and timetable associated with imposing one's will on the enemy CoG to the degree necessary to attain objectives.
In the summer of 1812, Napoleon invaded Russia for peripheral interests. Napoleon thought he could defeat the Russians in a short period of time; his enormous Army entered Russia clad only in summer uniforms. 40 His invasion put the Russians in a survival interest situation; the Russians were willing to fight indefinitely to protect the "Rodina" (Motherland). Aideed's desire for independent power could be sustained indefinitely because he was motivated by survival interests.
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THE LEVEL AND INTENSITY OF INTERESTS INVOLVED IN THE WOT
The United States' grand strategy necessarily considers the full range of opportunities to promote our interests, values, and purpose as well as means to prevent, deter, or defeat near and long term threats to them. Terrorism is one of these threats and the strategy to defeat radical Islamic terrorism should be subordinate to the larger American strategic calculus. 43 America reacted in justifiable rage to the barbaric attacks on "9-11". As the U.S. continues to unleash its power in full view of the international media and a wary world, the American people need to remain convinced --or be re-convinced --that the level of effort required and the costs, risks, and timelines associated with waging a war against terror are truly warranted by the intensity of the interests involved.
The Preamble of the U.S. Constitution eloquently defines the fundamental purposes of the United States --"to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity."
44
In NSC-68, a report to the National Security Council examining what U.S. strategy should be in light of the Soviet threat and the world the U.S. faced in 1950, the authors reflected on these purposes and argued that three American truths arise from them: the determination to maintain individual freedom; the determination to create conditions under which our free and democratic system can prosper; and the determination to fight as necessary to defend our way of life. 45 Historically, American interests have included four enduring themes: 1) defense of the United States and its constitutional system; 2) enhancement of the nation's economic well-being and promotion of U.S. products abroad; 3) -creation of a favorable world order; and 4) promotion abroad of U.S. democratic values and the free market system. 46 The American commitment to the purpose described in the Constitution, the resulting truths regarding American determination described in NSC-68, and U.S. enduring national interests remain strong today but are clearly under attack.
Radical Islamic fundamentalists, bound together by a common hatred of the United States and Israel and a common desire to repress any expansion of freedom and western influence in the Arab world 47 , have taken violence and terrorism to new extremes. Terrorism directly impacts enduring U.S. interests. Radical Islam and terrorist attacks --at home and abroad --can have devastating effects on U.S. economic interests. The economic loss just to New York City was over 105 Billion dollars just in the first month following the 9-11 attacks. 48 146,100 jobs were lost in New York as a result of the 9-11 suicide-murders. 49 The airline and tourism industries are still recovering from the attacks that occurred over three years ago as well as the rise in oil prices caused by the ensuing conflict. It is difficult to calculate the total direct and indirect costs of 9-11 or the potential economic impacts of similar attacks in the future. The spread of terrorism also clearly undermines world order in a way that the drafters of the United Nations Charter could not have envisioned. 50 Islamic extremists are dedicated to fracturing western alliances and coalitions and undermining governments that support them. Radical
Islam directly challenges America's most cherished values , denying basic rights of individual freedom to which Americans believe every human being is entitled and using terrorism as a means of repressing those who advocate greater freedom in the Middle East and around the world. The threat of terrorism at home undermines "domestic tranquility", the "general welfare", and the ability to live, free from fear, with our Constitution and values intact. Over 20 percent of Americans knew someone hurt or killed in the attacks on 9-11 and witnessed the barbarity of the attacks in media coverage. Humans were seen leaping out of flaming skyscrapers. Rescue workers and cleanup crews found almost 20,000 body parts. 51 The psychosocial cost of the attack was considerable. In New York City alone over 422,000 people suffered post-traumatic stress disorder. 52 The degrees to which America's purpose, values, and enduring interests can be impacted through terrorism are exponentially heightened by the prospects for terrorists to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Terrorists have shown that there are few, if any, limits to the violence they will use against American interests. The classical deterrence theory of the Cold War that worked very well with WMD-equipped adversaries who are rational nation states is unlikely to be successful against an amorphous collection of irrational non -state actors. 53 Policy makers should assume that if Al Qaeda and associated radical Islamic terrorist groups acquire WMD, they will attempt to use them against the west. 54 In his 1998 Fatwa, Osama Bin Laden called acquisition of WMD a "religious duty". 55 The survival of life in America as we know it is directly threatened by the nexus of radical Islamic terrorism and WMD. Accordingly, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism states that "the threat of terrorists acquiring and using WMD is a clear and present danger" 56 and that "we will never forget what we are fighting for --our fundamental democratic values and way of life." 57 The key phrase, "we will never forget," is not a self-fulfilling prophesy. America and Americans are busy and, absent the provocation of a new attack on the Homeland, could very well "forget" the interests involved in the WOT absent a concerted effort to keep our collective head in the game. 58 2008 will be a critical point in determining if the U.S. can sustain the required effort. If America fails to set --and then meet --expectations in Iraq or fail to communicate the cost/benefit equation in the broader WOT, the required long term non-partisan effort is likely to evaporate.
Meanwhile, the intensity of interests for radical Islamic terrorist groups is also extremely high. In the minds of their leaders, they are fighting for their fundamental, undemocratic values and way of life --the elimination of American and western influence and a return to the (imagined conditions of) 59 the "pious caliphate" and a Muslim state guided by Sharia law. 60 Many moderate Muslims do not aspire to this way of life yet tolerate extremists due to a combination of hate, fear, and ignorance, or a belief that the terrorists struggle against America is legitimate from a perspective of "physical and cultural self-defense." 61 The growth of freedom in the Middle East could yield more alternatives; less hate, fear, and ignorance; less alienation, and greater distance between moderate Muslims and extremists.
CENTER OF GRAVITY IN THE WOT
In the WOT there are many important sources of strength for the enemy. Terrorist leaders, groups, sanctuaries, communications, training camps, sources of finance, and weapons are all critical to their success and must be dealt with in U.S. strategy. 62 The friendly strategic CoG in this war is the ability to sustain the will of Americans to fight a proactive war against terrorists. While it is a global war requiring an international coalition, American leadership is the critical ingredient to leading that war and American will is the ultimate source of strength that can fuel sustained U.S. leadership. The friendly operational
CoG is more difficult. HUMINT and offensive anti-terrorism forces are the most indispensable military enablers to our joint, interagency, and multi-national efforts to defeat the enemy operational CoG abroad, in conjunction with law enforcement and other efforts at home.
Focused and synchronized diplomatic, informational, and economic action are indispensable to the larger efforts to ultimately isolate and impose our will on the strategic CoG in the larger WOT. Of all of these non-military sources of strength, the informational and economic elements of power are most essential to both sustaining our strategic CoG and defeating the enemy's in the WOT.
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. STRATEGY
MACRO ENDS, WAYS, AND MEANS RELEVANT TO WOT CENTERS OF GRAVITY
The near term objective in the war should be to defeat any large-scale terrorist attacks or WMD use against the homeland and to set the conditions for sustained non-partisan support of the long term campaign. The long term objective in the WOT should be to isolate and delegitimize radical Islamic terrorists both in the international community and in an increasingly moderate Arab world in order to ensure an end state where America and our friends --including emerging democracies in the Middle East --can live freely without the persistent fear of terrorism. Ways to achieve the military ends can generally be reduced to offensive, preventative, defensive (or some combination thereof) directed against terrorist groups, nationstates and other actors that support them (or some combination thereof). Ways to achieve the strategic ends include actions to isolate radical Islamic terrorists from more moderate Muslims and soft power options to increase the degree of moderation and pluralism in the Muslim world.
Globalization has past the point where western influence can be completely removed from the Middle East; disengagement is not a viable option. 65 All elements of national power must be intelligently leveraged to sustain American CoGs and impose U.S. will on the enemy to the degree necessary to attain our near and long term objectives.
While aggressive measures are needed to reduce vulnerabilities, a purely defensive approach to terrorism is not suitable, feasible, or acceptable. America's free and open society offers so many potential targets that defending them all would be a costly, reactive exercise in futility. 66 Americans need to understand that, at least for the foreseeable future, the enemy will attempt attacks using a myriad of tactics and while the U.S. will defeat most of them, America cannot and will not be able to stop all of them. 67 Winning the war requires an offensive and defensive combination that puts emphasis on "being a shooter rather than a target" --against both terrorists and any state or non-state actor that supports them. The U.S. must make it strongly undesirable to be a radical Islamic terrorist, to harbor them, provide funding to them, or even tolerate them. While America cannot reduce enemy attacks to zero, the U.S. must do whatever is necessary to prevent large-scale attacks and the use of WMD. Strategically, we must proactively intervene with societal conditions that teach 300 million Arabs, and each succeeding generation, that America, Israel, and western ideas are the source of their woes and to tolerate suicide-murder and lies in the name of a great religion. 68 This will take a long time terrorists seek to exploit; and proactively Defend the United States, our citizens, and our interests 69 . Although the term CoG is not explicitly used, the strategic and operational centers of gravity posited in the preceding theoretical discussion are addressed by the "4D" strategy. He emphasizes preventing the nexus of WMD and terrorism and winning the war of ideas to delegitimize terrorism. 70 He describes an end state where "the United States and its friends and allies will secure a world in which our children can live free from fear and where the threat of terrorist attacks does not define our daily lives." 71 The "old adage that the best defense is a good offense" 72 and the explicit goal of denying sponsorship to terrorism 73 show the administration has selected an overarching "way" that is a combination of offense and defense, against both terrorists and sponsors. It acknowledges the need for both hard power and soft power and the need for international cooperation. The Combating Terrorism strategy accurately cautions "because we are a free, open, and democratic society, we are and will remain, vulnerable to the dangers of terrorism" 74 and that "the United States will confront the threat of terrorism for the foreseeable future. " 75 The National Strategy for Homeland Security 76 complements the Combating Terrorism strategy. 77 The challenge is that not many Americans read national strategy documents. Clear language in speeches regarding the protracted nature of the WOT get drowned out and forgotten in generally myopic "news" sound bites about the car bombing du jour. Similarly, America's intentions and actions abroad are not neutrally represented in the international media or in Middle East schools, mosques, and cafes. Much remains to be done for both the domestic and international public's perceptions of U.S. intentions and actions to be favorably aligned with reality.
REFLECTIONS ON A PREVIOUS PROTRACTED CHALLENGE TO OUR WAY OF LIFE
The complexities, costs and risks, and timelines associated with defeating the enemy strategic and operational CoGs, coupled with the challenges of sustaining U.S. CoGs, are sobering. Some lack confidence that the war against radical Islamic terror is winnable.
Terrorism has been around for a long time. Anti-American terrorists are passionately committed to their cause. It is tough to imagine that they will not always be a force to be reckoned with.
But this is not the first great, sustained test of American resolve. Before concluding with some The whole success of the proposed program hangs ultimately on recognition by this Government, the American people, and all free peoples, that the cold war (substitute war against radical Islamic terror here) is in fact a real war in which the survival of the free world is at stake. Essential prerequisites to success are consultations with Congressional leaders designed to make the program the object of non-partisan legislative support, and a presentation to the public of a full explanation of the facts and implications of the present international situation. The prosecution of the program will require of us all the ingenuity, sacrifice, and unity demanded by the vital importance of the issue and the tenacity to persevere until our national objectives have been attained. 80 There are many differences between the WOT and the War against Communism. But like terrorism, Communism had been around a long time and its disciples became increasingly passionate in their cause over time. Like the WOT, "there were those who did not think it (the war against Communism) was worth fighting" 81 and those who questioned its costs. Like the WOT, WMD raised the stakes of the war of ideas in the Cold War. The horrors perpetuated in the East in the name of socialism had been capitalized on by a powerful and sophisticated pro-capitalist propaganda, which successfully used them to discredit every form of Marxist politics. The surviving group of revolutionary Marxists had been reduced to squabbling sects, without mass influence or political impact in any country whatever.
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The seemingly invincible foe --and its ideology --were defeated by successive generations who believed in freedom and democracy, internalized the threat posed by Soviet Communism, and were willing to sustain proactive efforts against it. Iraqi WMD programs and terrorism --one battle in a larger war. But the aftermath of the invasion exacted a toll from the U.S. strategic CoG. Predictably, it is also, in the near term, making the enemy strategic CoG stronger. The President believes that inserting democracies in the heart of the Arab world will ultimately spread freedom and help extinguish the flames of hatred, ignorance, and extremism that fuel terrorism in the region. 95 But the very thought of this idea is unacceptable to Islamic extremists and they will fight long and hard to abort emerging democracies in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere in the Arab world.
Potential asymmetries in timetables and cost/risk tolerance are a key concern. There are key points in time, such as the 2008 Presidential election, that impact America's ability to sustain non-partisan acceptance of this long term effort. In the short term, these need to be factored into military and interagency planning as the U.S. continues the push towards democracy in Iraq and prosecutes the larger WOT. It is essential that U.S. leaders set and achieve realistic but tangible objectives in Iraq prior to both the 2006 Congressional elections and the 2007 Presidential campaigning. America must see evidence of tangible benefits and decreasing cost and casualties or the achievements and sacrifices to date may be for naught.
This involves both actions and the perception of actions; information operations is critical.
Failure to sustain the effort in Iraq and reinforce the gains made in Afghanistan 96 until completion would irreversibly harm prospects for success in the region and in the larger war of ideas.
In the long term, the Army, Joint, and interagency team need to focus on protecting and sustaining our CoGs while defeating the enemy CoGs. Operationally, we must sustain sufficient HUMINT and offensive anti-terrorism forces and prevent adversaries from acquiring the ability to employ WMD or orchestrate large scale terrorist attacks against the homeland. Strategically, the U.S. needs to do a better job educating Americans as to the interests, timetable, and cost and risks involved and needs to achieve a much more effective use of all elements of national power to isolate extremists from moderate Muslims and reduce the levels of hatred, ignorance, and tolerance for anti-U.S. terrorism in the Islamic world.
CONCLUSION
Clausewitz's CoG theory, while not a panacea, is still important today. Its application to the U.S. -led war against radical Islamic terrorism suggests a protracted campaign that will be a true test of America's greatness reminiscent in many respects to the test the U.S. passed in defeating the Soviet Communist threat during the Cold War. The U.S. needs to achieve sufficient bipartisan consensus prior to 2008 to sustain the fight in this test of wills. Preventing the juncture of WMD and radical Islamic terrorists and eliminating their ability to plan and orchestrate large scale attacks will take a proactive use of all elements of power and will require great cooperation in an international community that has not fully internalized the need for a policy of preemption. The U.S. must do a better job educating Americans as to the interests, timetable, and cost and risks involved and must achieve a much more effective use of all elements of national power to reduce the levels of hatred, ignorance, and tolerance for anti -U.S. terrorism in the Muslim world.
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